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INTRODUCTION
The Constitution protects people, private corporations, states, and even
branches of the federal government. But does it protect municipalities?
For a long time, the answer was a resounding no. Municipalities were held
to be creatures of the state, having no rights beyond those given to them by the
state that created them.' Constitutionally, this doctrine, exemplified by Hunter
v. City of Pittsburgh,3 meant that when states gave powers to cities, this was a
unilateral action, not a contract; if the state wanted to take back the powers, the
Contracts Clause did not limit its ability to do so. Similarly, cities had no prop-
erty rights against their creating states, so the Due Process Clause gave them no
protection against state action. 4 In its most expansive form, this doctrine meant
that no part of the Constitution granted any rights to municipalities or munici-
pal residents qua residents. Thus, Justice Cardozo, in Williams v. Mayor, could
write for the Court that "[a] municipal corporation, created by a state for the
better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities under the Fed-
eral Constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator."
Then, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960), the Court was faced with Alabama's
blatantly racial gerrymandering of the city of Tuskegee "from a square to an un-
couth twenty- eight- sided figure . .. ."6 The defendant officials invoked Hunter
for the proposition that the state's power to shape the boundaries of municipal-
ities was not limited by the Constitution. The Court rejected this argument,
noting that Hunter's "seemingly unconfined dicta" swept too far.' The state's
1. This Note concerns the limitations on the constitutional rights of localities. The
legal literature in this area has focused on cities, towns, and counties, but other
political subdivisions are affected, such as school districts and local statutory au-
thorities for aviation, housing, health, and the like. Because the law today usually
does not differentiate between these entities, and because there is no precise term
that refers to all of them, I use the terms municipalities, political subdivisions, and
localities interchangeably. There may be reasons for treating the constitutional
rights of some of these entities differently, but that question requires the founda-
tion that this Note seeks to establish, and I leave it for another author.
2. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
3. Id. I refer to this as the Hunter doctrine, even if a given case does not cite Hunter
for the proposition. See Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional En-
forcement, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012) (defining the "Hunter doctrine"
as the rule that "localities ... cannot invoke the Constitution against their own
states" because they "are mere instrumentalities of state governments").
4. Morris, supra note 3, at 3.
5. 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933) (internal citations omitted).
6. 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960).
7. Id. at 344.
390
31 : 389 2013
MUNICIPAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
power over its municipalities could not be used to violate an individual's Fif-
teenth Amendment right to vote.
In the years since Gomillion, the Court has allowed municipalities to partic-
ipate, alongside individuals, in constitutional litigation against the state. While
the Court has not explicitly addressed the presence of the municipalities in
these cases, the implication of cases like Romer v. Evans' and Washington v.
Seattle School District No. 110 is that municipalities can suffer injury, and there-
fore have standing, when the state violates the constitutional rights of their resi-
dents.
Most recently, however, the Court has hinted at a return to Hunter's ancien
regime." Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Ass'n held that a state could prohibit local
governments from allowing employees to choose to contribute to a union's po-
litical action committee through automatic payroll deductions." Ysursa held
that, while this policy violated the First Amendment as applied to private em-
ployers, it did not touch the First Amendment when applied to public employ-
ers, including local governments, because it was akin to the state declining to
speak.13 Since local governments are "mere[] ... departments" of the state, the
silence imposed on them was no different than the silence imposed on the Ida-
ho Department of Motor Vehicles. 14 This, of course, is a fiction. Cities are,
among other things, sites of association. They are polities." The DMV is not.
Ysursa exhibits the worst tendencies of Hunter and its progeny. It resorts to
sweeping dicta rather than analysis. It forgets Hunter's purpose. And it forgets
that there has been a constitutional rights revolution since Hunter came down.
But Ysursa is not alone. Aside from Gomillion, there has been almost no
meaningful analysis of the Hunter doctrine in decades. Most cases replace pur-
posive or textual analysis with vague claims of sovereignty or rote references to
Hunter's "seemingly unconfined dicta.""
8. Id. at 344-45.
9- 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
10. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
11. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 362-64.
14. Id. at 362 (quoting Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923)).
15. David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147
U. PA. L. REV. 487, 490 (1999) ("[O]ur towns and cities are what we know them to
be: important political institutions that are directly responsible for shaping the
contours of 'ordinary civic life in a free society."' (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 631 (1996)).
16. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344 (1960) (describing Hunter's "seemingly
unconfined dicta"); see Ysursa, 355 U.S. at 363; Williams v. Mayor, 289 U.S. 36, 40
(1933); Trenton, 262 U.S. at 186-88.
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As a result, massive fissures have developed between the lower courts' un-
derstanding of the doctrine. This is especially problematic because the Supreme
Court takes few cases in this area of law. Courts disagree on the most basic
questions of municipal rights. First, they disagree on what kind of a rule Hunter
and its progeny establish-whether they mean that cities lack standing to bring
constitutional claims against their creating states, lack the capacity to sue and be
sued by their creating states, or lack constitutional rights against their creating
states. The Ninth and Tenth" Circuits construe Hunter as a doctrine of stand-
ing. New York state courts construe it as a doctrine about the capacity to sue. 9
By contrast, the Fifth Circuito and the California Supreme Court" have square-
ly held that the rule is one of substantive constitutional law, although subse-
quent cases in the Fifth Circuit have raised some questions about this holding.
The Sixth Circuit has adopted a similar position."
Second, courts disagree on whether the Hunter doctrine applies to all con-
stitutional rights or only certain constitutional rights. Courts generally hold that
Hunter limits claims under the Contracts Clause, the Just Compensation
Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, some courts, such as the
17. See Burbank- Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360,
1362 ( 9th Cir. 1998) ("[A] political subdivision of a state lacks standing under fed-
eral law to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute.").
18. See Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F-3d 619, 630 (ioth Cir. 1998) ("A polit-
ical subdivision has standing to sue its political parent on a Supremacy Clause
claim."); Hous. Auth. of Kaw Tribe of Indians v. City of Ponca City, 952 F.2d 1183
(ioth Cir. 1991) (holding that a housing authority had no standing to sue under
the Fourteenth Amendment, but did have standing to sue under the Fair Housing
Act).
19. See City of New York v. State, 655 N.E.2d 649, 654 (N.Y. 1995) ("[M]unicipalities
lack capacity to sue the State.").
20. See Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, io68 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[T]hese cases are
substantive interpretations of the constitutional provisions involved; we do not
think they hold that a municipality never has standing to sue the state of which it
is a creature."). But see Donelon v. Louisiana Div. of Admin. Law ex rel Wise, 522
F-3d 564, 568 n.6 (5th Cir. 2008) (criticizing Rogers, but not questioning its bind-
ing authority); Town of Ball v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 746 F.2d 1049, 1051 n.i
(5th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he Town of Ball has no standing to assert that the Parish's al-
location formula for the tax avails contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment.").
21. See Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 719 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1986) (allowing
municipal defendants to raise a Commerce Clause challenge to a state tax exemp-
tion in a refund case).
22. See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287, 290 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment do not
limit the state's ability to control municipal boundaries).
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Ninth Circuit, hold that it bars all federal constitutional claims. 3 Other courts
hold that it allows certain constitutional claims; the Fifth4 and Tenth 2 Circuits,
for example, permit Supremacy Clause challenges, while the California Su-
preme Court allows dormant Commerce Clause challenges.26 Note that, while
the Ninth and Tenth Circuits agree that Hunter is a doctrine of standing, they
disagree on what constitutional claims municipalities lack standing to bring.
Thus, the legal recourse available to municipalities and other political subdivi-
sions varies substantially in different regions of the country. For example, a
public airport authority whose expansion is frustrated by municipal policies
that may be preempted by federal law can sue to vindicate its rights in federal
court in Connecticut,'1 but not in California.21 Meanwhile, courts express no
clear understanding of why-in a purposive, textual, or originalist sense-the
Constitution protects municipalities much less than it protects other entities,
including private corporations. Contrast this with the constitutional obligations
of municipalities: as state actors, municipalities are bound by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and there is a richly developed (albeit contested) body of law re-
garding when municipalities can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Thus, the Hunter doctrine, in its myriad manifestations, has three main
flaws: purposelessness, inconsistency, and overbreadth.
When Hunter is read too broadly, municipalities cannot enforce the Con-
stitution. This can frustrate federal regulatory schemes and prevent individual
rights from being vindicated. For example, the Ninth Circuit has invoked Hunt-
er's progeny to block a city from challenging a regional planning agency's land
use regulations and transportation plans under the Takings and Supremacy
Clauses,30 a state-created health system from challenging a state Medicaid regu-
23. See Burbank- Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360,
1362 ( 9th Cir. 1998) ("[A] political subdivision of a state lacks standing under fed-
eral law to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute.").
24. See Rogers, 588 F.2d at 1057.
25. See Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F-3d 619, 628 (ioth Cir. 1998).
26. Star-KistFoods, 719 P.2d at 987.
27. Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Town of E. Haven, Conn., 582 F. Supp. 2d 261
(D. Conn. 2008) (allowing a suit by a public airport authority against a town,
without addressing the Hunter issue).
28. Burbank- Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 136 F.3d at 1362.
29. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); City of St. Louis v. Pra-
protnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986);
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); Owen v. City of Inde-
pendence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
30. City of S. Lake Tahoe v. Cal. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 625 F.2d 231 (9 th Cir.
1980). The Supremacy Clause allegation here is particularly fascinating: the city al-
leged that the California Regional Planning Agency, a political subdivision of the
state, acted in conflict with "the plans and ordinances of a similar administrative
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lation under the Supremacy Clause,31 and a public airport authority from chal-
lenging a city's action as preempted by federal aviation regulation.3 These deci-
sions frustrated Congress's decision to approve a bistate entity under the Com-
pact Clause, federal Medicaid law, and federal aviation law, respectively.
Overly broad readings of Hunter-doctrine cases threaten individual rights
when individual plaintiffs depend on municipal participation in their lawsuits,
perhaps for resource reasons. In Washington v. Seattle School District No. i, par-
ents and the school district sued the state to vindicate the district's right to bus
students in order to combat segregation.33 In Romer v. Evans, individuals and
municipalities sued the state to contest a state initiative removing their power to
enact local antidiscrimination ordinances.3 4 The Supreme Court allowed these
suits to proceed, without mentioning Hunter. But strong readings of Hunter,
including the Ninth Circuit's view and the reading suggested by the Court's re-
cent decision in Ysursa, would have blocked the municipal participation. A
proper understanding of Hunter and its progeny would not interfere with such
suits.
This is not to suggest that Hunter decisions always overreach. To the con-
trary, Hunter has an important role to play in ensuring that claims of municipal
right are not used to lock the state into policies that have outlived their useful-
ness. The problem is that the courts have forgotten this purpose of policy flex-
ibility. As a result, Hunter's reach is determined by the sweeping language of its
case law, not the reasons for its existence.
The reliance on Hunter's dicta rather than its rationale is especially proble-
matic because Hunter is an odd sort of constitutional rule. It does not follow the
usual rules of constitutional interpretation; it does not purport to be an inter-
pretation of the words or structure of the Constitution. Rather, it is stated as a
rule about the "nature of municipal corporations."35 In this sense, it sounds
body, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency-a bi-state agency established by
Compact between California and Nevada and approved by Congress-in viola-
tion of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution." Id. at 233.
31. Palomar Pomerado Health Sys. v. Belshe, i8o F.3d 1104 (9 th Cir. 1999) (relying on
S. Lake Tahoe, 625 F.2d at 233). But see Putz v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-0344 CW,
2010 WL 1838717, at *io (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2010) (holding that public authorities
created by county ordinance to deliver in-home supportive services "are not polit-
ical subdivisions for purposes of standing" because they are "established for the
sole and limited purpose of providing for the delivery of in-home supportive ser-
vices," unlike the health care districts in Palomar, which could levy taxes, issue
bonds, and use the power of eminent domain (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
32. Burbank- Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 136 F.3d at 1364 (relying on S. Lake Ta-
hoe, 625 F.2d at 233).
33. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
34. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
35. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 177 (1907).
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subconstitutional-or, as Kathleen Morris has argued36 like the kind of federal
general common law that was widespread in the 18oos before Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins.37 When Hunter is applied, it often means that constitutional val-
ues, if not constitutional rights per se, are limited. Courts should be reluctant to
extend, without purpose, a subconstitutional rule in order to limit constitution-
al rights.
Reacting to Hunter's uncertain but often sweeping nature, scholars in re-
cent years have critiqued the Hunter doctrine,38 called for its abolition,39 or
sought to soften its rougher edges. 40
David Barron has argued for greater constitutional recognition of local
governments, criticizing both Hunter and Dillon's Rule, which narrowly con-
strues any grants of power to municipalities. 4 Recently, Kathleen Morris, in a
work that inspired this Note, investigated Hunter in detail and concluded that:
(i) the courts have come to understand the Hunter doctrine as a general doc-
trine of local powerlessness to be invoked whenever it helps resolve a case; (2)
understood this way, the doctrine has no grounding in the Constitution or fed-
eral law, so it violates Erie; (3) stated this way, the doctrine has "the ring of' ca-
pacity to sue more than standing doctrine or substantive law, because it is fo-
cused on what localities intrinsically "are"; and (4) the logic underlying Hunter-
the-case is not, and never was, strong enough to support what courts and scho-
lars currently consider the Hunter-the-doctrine. 42 She and I part ways because I
identify a purpose in Hunter worth keeping. Other commentators have argued
for allowing municipalities to make one constitutional claim or another. They
have variously argued that municipalities should be able to assert procedural
36. Morris, supra note 3, at 3.
37. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
38. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 15, at 565-68; Richard Briffault, "What About the
'Ism'?" Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1303, 1336-49 (1994). See generally Morris, supra note 3, at 9-11 (discussing the
literature).
39. Morris, supra note 3, at 5.
40. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 15 at 568-95; Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-
The Structure ofLocal Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 96-99 (1990).
41. Barron, supra note 15, at 507-08, 562-68, 595-612.
42. Morris, supra note 3, at 4, 18-19, 25-34.
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due process claims against the state, 43 bring Supremacy Clause suits, 44 and sue
other cities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.-4
This Note seeks to do what no other commentators have tried: to construct
a full theory of the Hunter doctrine. I aim to build it with a guiding purpose
that prevents it from growing to monstrous proportions.
First, I show that, despite the purposeless discussions of Hunter in much of
the case law, Hunter does have a practical purpose: maintaining state flexibility
over the powers and contours of its municipalities. This purpose is as vital to-
day as it was years ago. State grants of powers or boundaries to municipalities
should not "tie the hands" of the state,46 forcing it to forever abide by decisions
that made sense at one point in time but later outgrew their usefulness. At one
point, a state might want many municipalities in a given area; later, good go-
vernance might require them to merge. 47 Or a state might want to exempt mu-
nicipal activities from taxation; later, it might realize that this was in error.4' A
state might first decide that it was best to transport citizens across a river by a
municipally run ferry; then, by a private toll bridge;49 and, still later, by a pub-
licly operated bridge free of tolls. 0 The Constitution should not be read to deny
states this policy flexibility over time. Thus, under Hunter, the Constitution
does not write the state's grants into stone by calling them contracts or proper-
ty.5
43. See, e.g., Michael A. Lawrence, Do "Creatures of the State" Have Constitutional
Rights?: Standing for Municipalities To Assert Procedural Due Process Claims
Against the State, 47 VILL. L. REV. 93 (2002).
44. See, e.g., Brian P. Keenan, Note, Subdivisions, Standing and the Supremacy Clause:
Can A Political Subdivision Sue Its Parent State Under Federal Law?, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 1899 (2005).
45. See, e.g., Caswell F. Hollway, IV, Comment, City v. City: The Case for Full Munici-
pal Personhood Under § 1983, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 479-
46. City of Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U.S. 231, 238 (1899).
47. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907) (holding that a Pennsylvania
act providing for the union of contiguous municipalities was not unconstitution-
al); see also Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78 (1881) (holding that a state has the
power to determine which parts of its territory fall within city limits).
48. See Covington, 173 U.S. at 231-32 (holding that a provision of a Kentucky act ex-
empting specified property from taxation did not prevent the Kentucky legislature
from withdrawing the exemption).
49. See Town of E. Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 51 U.S. 511 (1850) (holding that a
Connecticut act discontinuing a ferry when a bridge was built was not unconstitu-
tional).
50. See Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304 (1898).
51. There is a textual basis for this as well-the Constitution speaks of only two levels
of government, not three. I thank Richard Briffault for this reminder.
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Second, I set out to construct a coherent Hunter doctrine structured
around that purpose of state policy flexibility. I show that Hunter must be a
doctrine of substantive constitutional law, rather than one of standing or of ca-
pacity to sue, because policy flexibility can only be preserved by a doctrine that
protects state statutes from constitutional challenges regardless of procedural
posture, party identity, or forum. Hunter limits the rights of municipalities
themselves, but it should not limit the rights of individuals, nor the rights of
municipalities to protect their interests under the Supremacy Clause. Further-
more, I argue that a proper understanding of Hunter should allow municipali-
ties themselves to claim some constitutional rights against their creating states.
For example, municipal free speech is an area where the demand of state policy
flexibility is weak enough, and the ability of municipalities to vindicate consti-
tutional values is strong enough that the case for municipal rights is persua-
sive.,
Third, I consider Hunter's application when political subdivisions challenge
actions other than those by state legislatures. Courts have held that Hunter bars
constitutional challenges by one municipality to the actions of another. Cases
applying Hunter in this way interpret the doctrine incorrectly. Hunter limits
municipal actions only to allow state policy control. Municipal challenges to ac-
tions of other municipalities do not interfere with state policy. So municipalities
should have standing to challenge such actions just as they have standing to
challenge private actions that interfere with municipal property.
It is often remarked that the Constitution does not see localities.53 This
claim sweeps too broadly. In truth, the Constitution sees localities, but only
once states create them. In this way, localities are like property rights. State and
federal law construct property rights together: states create the rights, and fed-
eral due process creates further protections around those rights. Similarly, local-
ities are constructed in the first instance by state law, but once so constructed
they become the products of federal law as well.
I. HUNTER'S PURPOSE AND ITS PROBLEMS
A. Hunter's Historic Purpose
Hunter's origins go back centuries into the history of European law. Specif-
ically, the doctrine emerged from the much older European understanding that
corporate bodies exist at the grace of the sovereign. This conception of corpora-
52. See David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, ioo Nw. U. L. REV.
1637 (20o6). Fagundes's thought-provoking article explores whether state and lo-
cal governments should have free speech rights. It does not discuss the Hunter is-
sue of local governments' having rights against their creating states.
53. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 3, at 2 (observing but disagreeing with the "[c] ommon
legal wisdom" that "the Constitution does not 'see' local public entities, that they
are constitutionally invisible").
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tions was obviously of great political benefit to Europe's monarchs, as it gave
them control over the creation of private organizations.
Medieval common law viewed corporations as fictitious persons that could
not exist without a grant from the sovereign.5 4 As the common law corporate
concept developed, "the king's courts were concerned chiefly with munici-
pal ... groups." 5 The courts held that the special franchises of boroughs (a kind
of municipality) could exist only by royal grant; where boroughs had long ex-
isted, the courts constructed the legal fiction of the "lost grant" so as to main-
tain the notion that municipal corporations were dependent on the sovereign
will."6 This doctrine gave the king "a ready means of keeping lesser groups in
subordination to the state... and since incorporation would be granted only
for a price, a ready means of raising revenue was furnished."" It is not surpris-
ing, then, that "the heyday of the concession theory was during the period of
the Stuarts when royal absolutism was at its height."'" This was the time of the
brothers Charles II and James II, whose father had been deposed and executed
by the Parliamentary forces during the English Civil War.9
But, try as they might, the Stuart kings did not resolve the question for all
time. In i68o, as part of his campaign to pressure boroughs into electing less
whiggish representatives, Charles II brought an action quo warranto against the
City of London, threatening to remove its charter and chartered properties.o
Charles II won the case-and while London never actually returned its charter,
other boroughs quickly capitulated and did so.ol But by 1688, the political tide
had turned, and before the Parliamentarians overthrew him in the Glorious
Revolution, James II issued "A Proclamation for restoring Corporations to their
Ancient Charters, Liberties, Rights and Franchises."" After the Glorious Revo-
lution, London's arguments became, in Hendrik Hartog's words, "enshrined as
constitutional gospel," and the privileges of English boroughs became "unques-
tioned vested rights."6 3 Thus, at the time American cities were receiving their
charters-New York received its charter from the royal governor at the same
54. The common law borrowed this idea from the canon law. See E. Merrick Dodd,
Jr., Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associations, 42 HARV. L. REV. 977, 981
(1929).
55. Id. at 982.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 983.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 983 n.23.
6o. HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870, at 28 (198 3 ).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 28-29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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time that James was "waging war" on the chartered rights of England's bo-
roughs'4-the legal status of cities in England was a subject of great contesta-
tion. But in America, it was states, not municipalities, whose rights would be
enshrined as quasiconstitutional."
Until the early 18oos, there was no real law of municipal corporations."6
Public and private corporations were not differentiated.6 Instead, the differenc-
es in legal status were between incorporated bodies, which included chartered
cities and private corporations, and unincorporated bodies, which included
towns and counties." Corporations, whether public or private, were considered
independent entities, with special privileges against the state-and for that rea-
son, they were dangerous."'
In fact, the Revolutionary War and Jacksonian eras were marked by great
skepticism about the role of public and private corporations. Many Americans
believed that all types of corporations were antiegalitarian and monopolistic."
These concerns did not come out of nowhere. Corporations often did have spe-
cial franchises that they might abuse. For example, New York City's monopoly
over the ferry between Manhattan and Long Island "was the most important
issue in the political life of the young city of Brooklyn."1 Indeed, "the antebel-
lum history of Brooklyn is replete with mass public meetings, petitions, and
memorials to the state legislature and the New York Common Council, and re-
ports of local agitation over the quality, price, and quantity of ferry service.""
The ferry fee was alleged to be a "tribute exacted" from Brooklyn, an "unjust
and onerous tax," and a way of "taxing nonresidents by other (unlawful)
means."73 Brooklynites believed, not without reason, that they had "an equal
interest, and naturally an equal claim," in "the vast income of ferries."74 The in-
sufficient number of ferries was an even bigger problem."
64. Id. at 29.
65. See id. at 210 (noting the distinction between the rights of municipalities in early
nineteenth century America and England).
66. Id. at 185.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 186 (distinguishing between incorporated and unincorporated bodies); id. at
198 (distinguishing between incorporated and unincorporated municipalities).
69. Id. at 186.
70. Id.; Barron, supra note 15, at 498-99.
71. HARTOG, supra note 6o, at 242.
72. Id. at 244.
73. Id. at 245.
74. Id. (quoting NATHANIEL S. PRIME, A HISTORY OF LONG ISLAND, FROM ITS FIRST
SETTLEMENT BY EUROPEANS, TO THE YEAR 1845; WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ITS
ECCLESIASTICAL CONCERNS 375 (New York, Robert Carter 1845)).
75. Id.
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There were also legitimate complaints about the democratic foundations of
city governance. In 1800, sixty-two percent of adult men in New York City
could vote in state assembly and congressional elections, but only twenty-three
percent could vote in municipal elections." Philadelphia was even worse-its
"'closed' corporation ... effectively excluded most residents of the city from
participation in its affairs....". Moreover, cities of the day followed the Eng-
lish model in having no separation of executive, legislative, and judicial pow-
ers."8 Mayors were appointed, lacked a veto, and, along with aldermen, presided
over municipal courts." In the first half of the 18oos, influenced by the separa-
tion of powers model at the state and federal level, mayors became more like
governors and presidents. They became popularly elected and, in some cities,
gained a veto. This was a gradual process, though-mayoral elections spread in
the 1820s and 1830s,o while the mayoral veto took longer. Baltimore was the
first city to grant its mayor the veto, in 1797, while Boston and Philadelphia did
not do so until 1854." In some large cities, mayors did not lose their judicial role
until the 1900s.1
The difference between public and private corporations began to develop in
the early 18oos. In order to gain the political legitimacy needed to support
greater regulation at the municipal level, the Corporation of New York City
emphasized its public rather than proprietary qualities, and in doing so asso-
ciated itself with the legislature's power.8 3 By emphasizing that its lawmaking
powers derived from the legislature, New York gained greater legitimacy to
make law. Around the same time, political struggles led New York City to be-
come more democratic, with lower suffrage requirements and more election of
local officials.84
Meanwhile, courts, both state and federal, began distinguishing between
public and private corporations. The Supreme Court's distinction between the
state's plenary power over public corporations and its limited power over pri-
76. EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE, GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK CITY
TO 1898, at 330 (1998).
77. HARTOG, supra note 6o, at 36. Partly for that reason, Philadelphia's city govern-
ment was much less active, with more work done by statutory authorities. Id. at
36-37.





82. Id. at 549.
83. HARTOG, supra note 60, at 203.
84. BURROWS & WALLACE, supra note 76, at 330-31.
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vate corporations is often dated to Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819),"5 but
it was actually first expressed four years earlier in Terrett v. Taylor." In Terrett,
the Court considered whether Virginia's legislation divesting the Episcopal
Church of property acquired before the Revolutionary War violated the Con-
tracts Clause." The Court held that, whereas legislatures "may, under proper
limitations, have a right to change, modify, enlarge or restrain" public corpora-
tions such as municipalities as long as they "secur[e] ... the property for the
uses of those for whom and at whose expense it was originally purchased," leg-
islatures cannot destroy or divest private corporations of property "without the
consent or default of the corporators."" Because the Episcopal Church was a
private corporation, the legislative divestment violated the Contracts Clause.
The Dartmouth College case, concerning acts of New Hampshire affecting
Dartmouth's charter, affirmed this distinction between public and private cor-
porations."9 In matters concerning corporations that are "employed in the ad-
ministration of the government .. . the legislature of the State may act accord-
ing to its own judgment, unrestrained by any limitation of its power imposed
by the constitution of the United States.""o Private institutions, by contrast, are
not subject to such legislative plenary power, for they are "endowed with a ca-
pacity to take property for objects unconnected with government, whose funds
are bestowed by individuals on the faith of the charter.""1 As Justice Washington
elaborated in his concurrence, because a public corporation is "the mere crea-
ture of [a] public institution," it "maybe controlled, and its constitution altered
and amended by the government, as public interest may require."" The Dart-
mouth College Court continued: "Such legislative interferences cannot be said to
impair the contract by which the corporation was formed because there is in
reality but one party to it," that is, the government.93
85. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
86. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 51-52 (1815).
87. Id. at 52.
88. Id.
89. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 518.
90. Id. at 629-30.
91. Id. at 630.
92. Id. at 660-61 (Washington, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 661. The later case of Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of War-
ren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837), narrowed the gap between public and pri-
vate corporations. Where Dartmouth College held that the grant of powers to a
municipality is never a contract, Charles River Bridge held that, in general, state
franchise grants are not presumed to be exclusive, giving the state greater flexibili-
ty in the future. Thus, scholars "have argued that the Supreme Court in The
Charles River Bridge Case favored development by destroying the privileges and
vested rights of the old bridge's proprietors, and endorsing the creation of the new
bridge." Robert E. Mensel, "Privilege Against Public Right:" A Reappraisal of the
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Note that Terrett and Dartmouth College sound in the common law of cor-
porations rather than constitutional interpretation. They do not look at the text
or purpose of the Contracts Clause. Rather, they stake out a view on the nature
of public corporations.9 4 Of course, they are from a pre-Erie time, when general
federal common law was entirely acceptable.5 And state court cases were mov-
ing in a similar direction, widening the gap between public and private corpora-
tions. 6 There was also action in the political realm-New York's 1846 state con-
stitution removed the protection afforded to prerevolutionary royal grants and
the requirement of a two-thirds vote by both houses of the legislature on mat-
ters regarding corporations." "By the mid-1840s the notion that special privi-
leges or grants might continue to protect some cities from the reach of the sove-
reign had become too absurd to be treated seriously."'"
In the 18oos and early 19oos, numerous cases applied the reasoning of Ter-
rett and Dartmouth College to hold that state laws taking away municipal powers
did not violate the Contracts Clause. These cases concerned issues including the
state's control over public services, 9 the taxing power, 00 and the boundaries of
Charles River Bridge Case, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994); see also Deborah A. Ballam,
The Evolution of the Government-Business Relationship in the United States: Co-
lonial Times to Present, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 553, 591-92 (1994) ("The clear message
from the Charles River Bridge case was that the Supreme Court supported business
competition as essential for economic development.").
94. Cf Morris, supra note 3, at 18 ("At face value, Hunter announced a federal general
common law rule of the type that Erie [Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938)] later extinguished. The Hunter Court announced that it intended to define
the nature of municipal corporations.. .. " (internal quotation marks omitted)).
95. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
96. HARTOG, supra note 60, at 199, 209-11.
97. Id. at 216.
98. Id.
99. See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923) (holding that a state can re-
quire a city to pay for diversion of water from a river, notwithstanding the fact
that the city purchased rights from a private company before the state water
charges were enacted); City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., 250 U.S. 394
(1919) (holding that a state can regulate rates and service at which natural gas is
provided to city and its inhabitants, notwithstanding a contract between the city
and the company); City of Worcester v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 196 U.S.
539 (1905) (holding that a state can require a city to upkeep portions of street cov-
ered by street railway track, notwithstanding contract between the city and a rail-
way company to the contrary); Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U.S. 231, 238 (1899)
(holding that a state can tax a municipal waterworks, a previous exemption not-
withstanding, because "the exemption from taxation embodied in that act did not
tie the hands of the commonwealth of Kentucky, so that it could not, by legisla-
tion, withdraw such exemption, and subject the property in question to taxa-
tion"); Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304 (1898) (holding that a state can change
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municipalities."o' They established that the Contracts Clause did not make the
grant of boundaries, franchises, powers, or tax exemptions irrevocable by the
state, nor did a city's decision to enter into a contract regarding the provision of
services block future legislation regarding those services. Because legislation
granting powers to municipalities never constituted a contract, legislative rever-
sal never impaired a contract. This doctrine was subsequently expanded to the
Fourteenth Amendment, so that municipal powers were not considered "prop-
erty," the deprivation of which required due process. Claims under the Con-
tracts and Due Process Clauses were held to "depend ultimately upon the same
arguments. If the legislature of the State has the power to create and alter school
districts and divide and apportion the property of such district no contract can
arise, no property of a district can be said to be taken . . . ."12 Municipal claims
under the Just Compensation Clause were similarly rejected.1 03
The best way to understand these cases is as an effort to ensure that the
state legislature retained flexibility in its policy towards municipalities. For ex-
ample, in 1819, Illinois passed a law requiring that slave owners who emanci-
pated their slaves give a bond to the county for their maintenance. 10 4 In 1825,
Illinois repealed the law. In the interim, Edward Coles freed ten slaves in Madi-
son County, and the county brought an action against him for the debt of two
thousand dollars. Coles argued that the 1825 legislation eliminated the debt,
while the County responded that, if so, the 1825 legislation violated a contract
between the state and the county created by the financial obligations of the 1819
legislation, thereby violating the Contracts Clause (and the analogous clause of
the Illinois Constitution). The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed. The financial
benefit of the 1819 legislation to the county was not irrevocable. While the legis-
lature could not interfere with private corporations, "all public incorporations
which are established as a part of the police of the state, are subject to legislative
control, and may be changed, modified, enlarged, restrained, or repealed, to suit
municipal franchises regarding transportation over the Connecticut River); Town
of E. Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 51 U.S. 511 (1850) (same).
ioo. See, e.g., Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 38-39 (1933)
(holding that a state can exempt property of a single railroad from state and local
taxes); Covington, 173 U.S. at 238 (holding that a state can tax a municipal water-
works, a previous exemption notwithstanding).
ioi. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); Attorney Gen. ex rel. Kies v.
Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905) ("The legislature of a State has absolute power to make
and change subordinate municipalities."); Forsyth v. City of Hammond, 166 U.S.
5o6 (1897) (holding that a state can authorize a city to annex contiguous territory
without the consent of the owner); Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78 (1881); Laramie
Cnty. Comm'rs v. Albany Cnty. Comm'rs, 92 U.S. 307 (1875).
102. Kies, 199 U.S. at 239.
103. Trenton, 262 U.S. at 183, 185-87.
104. See Coles v. Cnty. of Madison, I Ill. (Breese) 154 (1826); see also HARTOG, supra
note 60, at 199 (discussing and quoting Coles).
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the ever varying exigencies of the state.",o, This holding was critical-otherwise,
the fact that the state's emancipation policy implicated counties would make
emancipation policy immutable, even as public opinion about the evils of sla-
very shifted.
The two cases of Town of East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Companyo6 and
Williams v. Eggleston"o provide clear examples of how the Supreme Court pro-
tected states' flexibility over municipalities' role in providing public services.
Both cases concerned transportation over the Connecticut River, a route that
affected the citizens of multiple towns. Around 1680, the Connecticut legislature
had granted a ferry franchise to Hartford."'s Half of the franchise was trans-
ferred to East Hartford upon that town's creation by the legislature in 1783.10' In
the early 18oos, Connecticut passed a series of acts providing for a toll bridge
over the river, to be operated by the Hartford Bridge Company. These acts al-
ternately restricted and restored the towns' ferry rights. The Court held in Town
of East Hartford that these acts did not violate the Contracts Clause because the
original grant of the ferry rights sounded in public law, not contract."o Both the
relationship of the state to the town and the subject matter of the action were
probative."' The laws "related to public interests," and "the towns being mere
organizations for public purposes, were liable to have their public powers,
rights, and duties modified or abolished at any moment by the legislature."
The events that prompted Williams v. Eggleston began in 1887, when Con-
necticut decided to turn the toll bridge into a free public highway.1 13 After cycl-
ing through a variety of funding mechanisms, in 1895 the legislature delegated
the maintenance duties to a new bridge and highway district, whose board and
funds would come from five nearby towns.114 Hartford supplied four of the
eight board members and was responsible for seventy-nine percent of the fund-
ing; the remaining smaller towns had one board member each and a varying
share of the budget responsibilities. 11 5 When Glastonbury refused to pay its
share, the board sought a writ of mandamus compelling it to do so. Glaston-
105. Coles, 1 Ill. (Breese) at 160 (emphasis added).
106. 51 U.S. 511 (1850).
107. 170 U.S. 304 (1898).
108. Town ofE. Hartford, 51 U.S. at 532.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 534.
M11. Id.
112. Id.
113. 170 U.S. 304 (1898).
114. Id. at 304-08.
115. Id. at 307.
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bury defended its refusal to pay on due process and equal protection grounds."'
Glastonbury's equal protection argument emphasized that "these five towns are
put into a class by themselves, organized into a single municipal corporation,
and separated from other towns in the state by being subjected to different con-
trol in respect to highways.""' The Court denied this claim on classical state su-
premacy grounds: "A municipal corporation is, so far as its purely municipal
relations are concerned, simply an agency of the state for conducting the affairs
of government, and as such ... the Federal Constitution does not limit the
power of the state."
The Connecticut River cases, Town of East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge
Company and Williams v. Eggleston, illustrate the flexibility purpose of state
creature doctrine later exemplified by Hunter. The best way to transport people
over the Connecticut River changed over time, and the rule established in these
cases ensured that the state's policy was not constrained by the demands of a
prior time.
Similarly, states should not be locked into certain arrangements of munici-
pal boundaries that made sense at one time but no longer facilitate the demands
of good governance. Kelly v. Pittsburgh" and Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh1 20
show how the Court has protected states' flexibility over municipal boundaries.
They both concerned the boundaries of the city of Pittsburgh. Kelly began when
the Pennsylvania legislature expanded the city limits of Pittsburgh. This placed
Mr. Kelly's land within Pittsburgh's city limits, increasing his tax burden. Mr.
Kelly challenged the city's decision to tax his farmland as city property as a mat-
ter of due process. The Court rejected this challenge. 1 In doing so, the Court
went out of its way to make clear, though Mr. Kelly did not claim otherwise,
that "the legislature could rightfully enlarge the boundary of the city of Pitts-
burgh so as to include the land."1 2 The allocation of territory to municipalities
"is one of the most usual and ordinary subjects of State legislation." 13
The second Pittsburgh boundary case, and the most famous124 of the state
supremacy cases, is Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh.5 Pennsylvania had a law pro
116. Id. at 308.
117. Id. at 309-10.
118. Id. at 31o.
119. 104 U.S. 78 (1881). This was the first Supreme Court case about a dispute over
municipal boundaries in which a party claimed Fourteenth Amendment rights.
120. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
121. Kelly, 104 U.S. at 81.
122. Id. at 80.
123. Id. at 81.
124. Barron, supra note 15, at 562 ("Although the cases are legion that assert that state
law defines the scope of local governmental power, none has done so more force-
fully, or more famously, than Hunter v. City ofPittsburgh.").
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viding for the consolidation of contiguous cities if the majority of their com-
bined citizenry voted to merge. The merger of Pittsburgh and Allegheny was
put to a vote. A majority of Pittsburgh residents voted in favor, and though Al-
legheny residents voted against, they were vastly outnumbered. The city of Al-
legheny and residents of that city sued to prevent the consolidation of the two
cities, claiming that the law deprived them "of their property without due
process of law, by subjecting [them] to the burden of the additional taxation
which would result from the consolidation."" 6 The Court held that "principles
long settled" established that "[miunicipal corporations are political subdivi-
sions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the go-
vernmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them."1 ' As a result,
"[t] he number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these [mu-
nicipal] corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests
in the absolute discretion of the state... unrestrained by any provision of the
Constitution of the United States."' 8 This sweeping statement describes the
outer limits of the Hunter doctrine.
The policy flexibility argument remains as strong today as it ever was. As
the Illinois emancipation, Connecticut River, and Pittsburgh boundary cases
show, the world changes and policy should often change with it. New York State
should be able to grant New York City greater taxing authority"1 9 without wor-
rying that it will be unable to remove that power if it becomes more a source of
abuse than benefit. The Constitution should not impose a one-way ratchet,
where states can only grant powers to municipalities, not take them away.
Once we understand why Hunter is important, we can understand what
shape it should take and where it should-or should not-apply. I now turn to
that discussion.
B. Hunter's Problems
The problem with Hunter is that it has not caught up to our modern Con-
stitution. In the beginning, Hunter only limited the operation of the Contracts
Clause, because that was the only part of the Constitution that purported to
limit state power over municipalities. After the Reconstruction Amendments
became law, the Supreme Court confronted the question of whether those limi-
tations on state power applied to the power of states over municipalities. It de-
cided, in the late 18oos and early 19oos, that the Amendments did not protect
municipalities. In so deciding, the Court did not focus on the text or purpose of
125. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
126. Id. at 177.
127. Id. at 178.
128. Id. at 178-79.
129. See Erin Adele Scharff, Taxes as Regulatory Tools: An Argument for Expanding New
York City's Taxing Authority, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1556 (2011) (arguing persuasively
for granting New York City independent taxing authority).
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the Reconstruction Amendments. Rather, it relied on the "nature of municipal
corporations, their rights and duties, and the rights of their citizens and credi-
tors."130
Of course, since then, the world has not stood still. The constitutional
rights revolution greatly expanded the meaning and reach of the Reconstruction
Amendments.13 1 In 1960, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the Court recognized that the
Fifteenth Amendment reduced the breadth of the Hunter doctrine.13 Gomillion
held that African-American residents of Tuskegee could state a claim under the
Fifteenth Amendment against Alabama's blatantly racial gerrymandering of the
city "from a square to an uncouth twenty- eight- sided figure . . . ."133 The defen-
dant officials invoked Hunter for the proposition that the state's power to shape
the boundaries of municipalities was not limited by the Constitution. The
Court rejected that argument, holding that
a correct reading of the seemingly unconfined dicta of Hunter and kin-
dred cases is not that the State has plenary power to manipulate in
every conceivable way, for every conceivable purpose, the affairs of its
municipal corporations, but rather that the State's authority is unre-
strained by the particular prohibitions of the Constitution considered
in those cases. 13 4
Thus, "[1] egislative control of municipalities, no less than other state power, lies
within the scope of relevant limitations imposed by the United States Constitu-
tion. ..... 'The power of the State to alter or destroy its corporations is not great-
er than the power of the state to repeal its legislation." 35 Because the racial ger-
rymandering at issue would have undermined the plaintiffs right to vote, it
violated the Fifteenth Amendment.136 Gomillion therefore treated Hunter as a
substantive limitation on "particular prohibitions of the Constitution." 3
While Gomillion represented a strong statement about the limitations on
state power over municipalities, after Gomillion, the Court has been rather quiet
about what remains of Hunter. Though the Court has subsequently allowed a
number of suits challenging state power over municipalities-under the First
130. Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178.
131. See, e.g., CHARLES R. Epp, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 27 (1998) (introducing "[t]he
U.S. Rights Revolution").
132. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
133. Id. at 340.
134. Id. at 344.
135. Id. (quoting Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248, 253 (1906)).
136. Id. at 345. The Court subsequently held that Gomillion should have been decided
under the Fourteenth rather than the Fifteenth Amendment. Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630, 645 (1993).
137. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 344.
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Amendment,138 the Equal Protection Clause,139 and the Supremacy Clause 40 it
has done so without addressing the Hunter issue. As a result, the lower courts,
groping around in the darkness, have gone down very different paths. Some
have a near-totalizing view of Hunter, prohibiting municipalities from claiming
any constitutional rights,1 41 while others take a more nuanced view. 142 Substance
and procedure are intertwined. A number of courts have grown to understand
Hunter as a rule of standing, which in the Ninth Circuit leads to the conclusion
that municipalities cannot bring any constitutional or statutory claims against
their creating states. 143 Wright and Miller summarize, perhaps too sweepingly:
Although it may be that at times a municipality can assert rights against
its state under federal statutes, the Fourteenth Amendment does not
confer rights on municipal corporations against their states. The same
138. See Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (ultimately upholding a challenged
state statute).
139. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (ruling for plaintiff municipalities and in-
dividuals challenging a statewide voter initiative prohibiting municipalities from
including sexual orientation in local antidiscrimination ordinances, without ex-
pressing any discomfort with the presence of the municipalities in the litigation);
Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (agreeing on the merits
and expressing no concern with the presence of the school district plaintiffs in the
litigation, when plaintiff school districts, along with the United States and several
community organizations as intervenors, challenged a statewide voter initiative
placing limitations on local busing initiatives, even granting them fees, thereby
explicitly validating their status as litigants).
140. See Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256 (1985)
(holding for a school district suing a county by invalidating a state statute as in-
consistent with the federal Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act under the Supremacy
Clause); City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958) (holding that
Congress had validly authorized the Federal Power Commission to bestow the
power to condemn state-owned land on the City of Tacoma). While Tacoma ex-
plicitly discusses Congress's power to legislate under the Commerce Clause, not
the Supremacy Clause, it is about federal power trumping state power.
141. Burbank- Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360 (9th
Cir. 1998).
142. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits allow Supremacy Clause challenges. See Branson
Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F-3d 619, 628 (ioth Cir. 1998); Rogers v. Brockette,
588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1979). The California Supreme Court permits dormant
Commerce Clause challenges. Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 719
P.2d 987 (Cal. 1986).
143. See Burbank- Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 136 F.3d 1360. While the Tenth Cir-
cuit holds that Hunter is a rule of standing that only applies to certain constitu-
tional provisions, the more natural result of treating Hunter as a rule of standing
is, per the Ninth Circuit, to make it a totalizing rule that blocks all constitutional
claims, and perhaps even all statutory claims. Compare Branson, 161 F.3d at 628
(allowing Supremacy Clause challenges), with Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport
Auth.,_136 F.3d at 1362 (prohibiting all constitutional challenges).
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rule applies when a municipal corporation seeks to sue another munic-
ipal corporation created by the same state, and the lack of constitution-
al right cannot be circumvented by attempting to rely on proprietary
rather than governmental interests. 144
Thus, courts have cited the Hunter doctrine to prevent a variety of substate
entities from suing the state and each other.145 Public corporations are held to
lack the constitutional rights that their private counterparts hold, even when
public and private corporations serve the same functions. Consider the long-
running dispute between the City of Burbank and the Burbank- Glendale-
Pasadena Airport Authority. The Burbank- Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authori-
ty, a "Joint Powers Agency" created by the cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pa-
sadena pursuant to California Government Code § 6500, sought to acquire one
hundred and thirty acres of privately held land in Burbank to build a new ter-
minal.146 California law permits a city to require that, if a publicly owned airport
seeks to expand onto new land, the city or county where the property is located
must first hold a hearing and approve the plan.147 The City of Burbank adopted
review procedures pursuant to this statute; the procedures essentially restated
the terms of the statute.148 The airport authority sued, challenging the statute
and review procedures as a violation of federal law and therefore the Supremacy
Clause. The court held that the airport authority, as a political subdivision,
could not challenge the constitutionality of a state statute or procedures in fed-
144. 13B CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDER-
AL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.11.1 1.46 (3d ed. 2012).
145. See text accompanying notes 30-32; see also Hous. Auth. of Kaw Tribe v. City of
Ponca City, 952 F.2d 1183 (ioth Cir. 1991) (prohibiting a state-created Indian
Housing Authority from challenging a municipal action under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause); S. Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Twp. of Washington, 790 F.2d 500,
503-04 (6th Cir. 1986) (prohibiting a municipally owned waste disposal corpora-
tion from challenging a town's ordinance under the Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses); City of New Rochelle v. Town of Mamaroneck, III F. Supp. 2d
353, 357-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (prohibiting one town from challenging another
town's ordinance under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, but allow-
ing a dormant Commerce Clause challenge). But see Putz v. Schwarzenegger, No.
10-00344 CW, 2010 WL 1838717, at *io (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2010) (holding that pub-
lic authorities created by county ordinance to deliver in-home supportive services
"are not political subdivisions for purposes of standing" because they are "estab-
lished for the sole and limited purpose of providing for the delivery of in-home
supportive services," unlike the health care districts in Palomar, which could levy
taxes, issue bounds, and use the power of eminent domain (internal citations and
quotations omitted)).
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eral court. 149 Meanwhile, parallel litigation was ongoing in state court. The state
court of appeals reached the merits on the Supremacy Clause claim, holding
that federal law regulating airport noise and safety did not preempt the state
statute at issue."'o The effect of the Hunter rule in the Ninth Circuit, then, was to
drive litigation over federal preemption into state court. A private airport au-
thority could get a federal court to review its preemption claim, but a public
airport authority could not. By contrast, a similar case in Connecticut, involv-
ing a preemption dispute between New Haven's Tweed Airport and the Town
of East Haven, was litigated in federal district court, where the airport suc-
ceeded in its preemption claim."' Compounding the absurdity, a federal district
court within the Ninth Circuit has held that public health authorities created by
county ordinance to deliver in-home supportive services could sue state officials
for violations of the federal Medicaid Act, because they were not political subdi-
visions." Thus, the county, which itself could not sue the state or its officials
over federal law, could create an entity that could sue!
Nor is it just the lower courts that have forgotten Gomillion and returned to
"the seemingly unconfined dicta of Hunter and kindred cases."153 As discussed
in the Introduction, the Supreme Court's recent holding in Ysursa v. Pocatello
Education Ass'n'54 is a maximalist reading of Hunter, with no mention what-
soever of Gomillion or the subsequent cases where it allowed municipal claims
but was silent on the Hunter issue. Ysursa concerned a state law prohibiting
employers from allowing employees to select payroll deductions for a union's
political action committee. The court below had held that this policy violated
the First Amendment as applied to private employers but not as applied to the
state as an employer. Neither of these conclusions was contested on appeal. In-
stead, the issue was whether the law violated the First Amendment as applied to
municipal employers. The Court held that the analysis was the same for munic-
ipal as state employers, since local governments are mere "departments" of the
state.15
Ysursa also casts doubt on the ability of municipalities to sue when states
violate individual rights by manipulating municipal powers. The Court allowed
municipal participation in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,"' where
149. Id.
150. City of Burbank v. Burbank- Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 28,
38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
151. Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Town of E. Haven, Conn., 582 F. Supp. 2d 261
(D. Conn. 2008). Here, the district court did not even mention the Hunter issue.
152. Putz v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-0344 CW, 2010 WL 1838717, at *io (N.D. Cal.
May 5, 2010).
153. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344 (1960).
154. 555 U.S. 353 (2009).
155. Id. at 362 (citing Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923)).
156. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
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parents and the school district sued the state to vindicate the district's right to
bus students to combat segregation, and in Romer v. Evans,"' where individuals
and municipalities sued the state to contest a state initiative removing their
power to enact local antidiscrimination ordinances. But if a municipality truly
"has no privileges or immunities under the federal constitution which it may
invoke in opposition to the will of its creator,""'1 it is not clear if a municipality
can suffer an injury sufficient to confer standing against its creating state. Yet
Ysursa did not mention the potential conflict with these cases.
II. RECONSTRUCTING HUNTER
This Part seeks to construct a coherent theory of Hunter that achieves the
purpose of state policy flexibility without being overbroad. I begin with the
question, contested in the lower courts, of what kind of a rule Hunter is-that
is, whether it is a rule of substantive constitutional law, standing, or capacity to
sue. After demonstrating that Hunter is a rule of substantive constitutional law,
I turn to Hunter's substantive reach. I show that the Constitution (i) protects
municipal residents from state action that, by manipulating municipal powers
or boundaries, would violate individual rights; (2) ensures the supremacy of
federal law regarding municipalities; and (3) should even grant rights to muni-
cipalities themselves if those rights would not overly impinge on state policy
flexibility. Finally, I examine how the Constitution protects municipalities from
nonlegislative state actions, such as those by municipalities and administrative
agencies. I show, contrary to all authority, that Hunter should not deprive mu-
nicipalities of constitutional rights against each other, but that it should limit
municipal constitutional rights against state administrative agencies acting le-
gislatively.
A. Hunter Is a Rule of Substantive Constitutional Law
Courts disagree about whether the Hunter doctrine is a rule of standing,"'
capacity to sue and be sued,'o or substantive constitutional law.' But as the
157. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
158. Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 363 (quoting Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40
(1933)).
159. See Burbank- Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360,
1362 (9 th Cir. 1998); Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F-3d 619, 628 (ioth
Cir. 1998); Hous. Auth. of Kaw Tribe v. City of Ponca City, 952 F.2d 1183, 1188
(ioth Cir. 1991).
16o. See City of New York v. State, 655 N.E.2d 649 (N.Y. 1995).
161. See Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1058 (5th Cir. 1979) (squarely holding that
Hunter is a doctrine of substantive constitutional law); Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v.
Cnty. of Los Angeles, 719 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1986) (same); see also Carlyn v. City of
Akron, 726 F.2d 287, 290 (6th Cir. 1984) (also indicating that Hunter is a substan-
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Fifth Circuit observed in Rogers v. Brockette, Hunter is driven by a substantive
purpose regarding the relationship between the Constitution and the "internal
political organization of states."' This substantive purpose shows that it must
be a rule of substantive constitutional law. And, at some level, the Supreme
Court seems to have understood this, as evidenced both by the cases where it
has applied Hunter and by the cases where it has declined to apply it.
As discussed in the previous Part, the Hunter doctrine is important because
it allows states to maintain flexibility in their municipal policy. As demography,
the economy, and technology change, the state might sensibly want to change
the powers or boundaries of its municipalities. If municipal powers or bounda-
ries are constitutionally cognizable contracts or property, state flexibility is in-
hibited. Hunter prevents such powers and boundaries from being set in stone by
the Constitution. It avoids a one-way ratchet problem, whereby municipalities
accrue more and more rights and independence of the state over time.
In order to fulfill the purpose of state policy flexibility, Hunter must be a
rule about what states can do to municipalities. It must be a constant rule about
policymaking authority-what laws states can enact-that holds true regardless
of what procedural posture the law is challenged under or what court the law is
challenged in.
If Hunter were a doctrine of standing or capacity to sue, by contrast, private
parties might be able to get a court order invalidating laws changing a city's
boundaries or revoking municipal franchises, because in a suit between private
parties and the state, Hunter would not apply. In that world, the powers that
states grant to cities would be contracts protected by the Contracts Clause, but
only private parties could bring suit seeking to enforce those rights.'63 It is hard
to fathom what purpose such a rule would further. It would certainly not give
states a broad writ of policy flexibility; rather, they would have a patchwork of
flexibility depending on whether actions would be challengeable by private par-
ties.
Moreover, municipalities could act to undermine state flexibility by using
contracts to give private parties a particularized interest sufficient to confer
standing. This cannot be right. The principle that the Contracts and Due
Process Clauses do not lock the state into its initial arrangement of municipal
powers and boundaries cannot depend on whether the municipality happens to
be plaintiff or defendant. Furthermore, if Hunter were a rule of standing that
applied regardless of constitutional or statutory provision, it would reach fur-
ther than its purpose demands. As I discuss in the next Section, state policy flex-
ibility does not demand that Hunter prevent municipalities from bringing suits
tive doctrine, by stating that "[t]he sweeping language of Hunter and Holt has
been modified in respect to manipulation of municipal boundaries for purposes
of race discrimination in voting").
162. 588 F.2d at 1o69.
163. In this alternate universe, the private parties would either have to show Article III
standing or bring suit in state court and satisfy that state's standing requirements.
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to vindicate individual rights, federal regulatory regimes, or even certain mu-
nicipal rights.
Why, then, have a number of courts construed Hunter as a doctrine of
standing? Unfortunately, the circuit court opinions treating Hunter as a doc-
trine of standing do little to aid our investigation. The Ninth Circuit's rule
comes from one short paragraph in City of South Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency.164 That decision quoted the Second Circuit's holding
in City of New York v. Richardson that "[p]olitical subdivisions of a state may
not challenge the validity of a state statute under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."'6 5 But Richardson did not frame its holding in terms of standing. And in
South Lake Tahoe, the Ninth Circuit gave no further explanation for its holding
that the city lacked standing, apart from a series of citations to Supreme Court
cases from the early twentieth century. In fact, South Lake Tahoe does not even
mention the standing conclusion in the text-its only appearance comes in the
paragraph heading. As the California Supreme Court stated in declining to fol-
low South Lake Tahoe, "[regrettably, the South Lake Tahoe decision provides
little guidance as to the court's reasoning in choosing a per se rule.""' Yet, the
Ninth Circuit has continued to follow the South Lake Tahoe rule."'
The view that Hunter is a rule of standing seems to come from language in
two Supreme Court cases from the 1930s. In the first, Williams v. Mayor of Bal-
timore, municipal officials from Baltimore and Annapolis alleged that a Mary-
land statute exempting a railroad from state and local taxes was invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause and the Maryland constitution.' Justice Cardozo,
writing for the Court, first dispatched with the equal protection claim with
words that are now often quoted': "A municipal corporation, created by a
state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities
under the federal constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of
its creator."1"o Then, after dealing with the Maryland claim on the merits, he
noted that the Court had "assumed, without deciding, that the respondents,
though without standing to invoke the protection of the Federal Constitution,
will be heard to complain of a violation of the Constitution of the state.""' He
explained that "[t]heir standing for that purpose, at least in the state courts, is a
164. 625 F.2d 231, 233 (9 th Cir. 1980).
165. 473 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1973).
166. Star-Kist Foods, 719 P.2d at 990.
167. See Palomar Pomerado Health Sys. v. Belshe, 180 F.3d 1104 (9 th Cir. 1999); Bur-
bank- Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360 (9th Cir.
1998).
168. 289 U.S. 36 (1933).
169. See, e.g., Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 363 (2009).
170. Williams, 289 U.S. at 40.
171. Id. at 47-48 (emphasis added).
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question of state practice, as to which the federal courts do not exercise an in-
dependent judgment," and that the Maryland courts have assumed that "mu-
nicipal corporations assailing a statute of exemption or other special legislation
have an interest in the controversy which entitles them to be heard.""
The second case, Coleman v. Miller, considered whether Kansas state legis-
lators could invoke the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to challenge the
Secretary of State's conclusion that the legislature had ratified the Child Labor
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.1 73 The Secretary of State challenged the
Court's jurisdiction on the grounds that petitioners had no standing to have the
judgment of the state court reviewed. In rejecting this claim, the Court noted
"other instances in which the question of what constitutes a sufficient interest
to enable one to invoke our appellate jurisdiction has been involved."174 It ob-
served that "[t] he principle that the applicant must show a legal interest in the
controversy ... has been applied repeatedly in cases where municipal corpora-
tions have challenged state legislation affecting their alleged rights and obliga-
tions."' This language also frames the Hunter issue in standing, but it is far
from a thorough discussion of how the modern doctrine of standing applies to
Hunter cases.
These cases do use the word "standing." But as the Fifth Circuit has pointed
out, when they were decided,
"standing" generally meant something somewhat different from what it
means today. A party had standing or a "right to sue" if it was correct
in its claim on the merits that the statutory or constitutional provision
in question protected its interests; standing was not seen as a prelimi-
nary or threshold question. In speaking of "standing," cases in the
Hunter and Trenton line meant only that, on the merits, the municipal-
ity had no rights under the particular constitutional provisions it in-
voked. This is why the Hunter and Trenton series of cases did not men-
tion the criteria we now associate with inquiries into standing the
extent of an actual injury and of a genuine case or controversy, for ex-
ample."'
With our current conception of standing, it is not even clear how one would
show that municipalities can never show the Article III requirements for stand-
ing of injury-in-fact, causation, or redressability against their creating state."'
The use of "standing" in Williams and Coleman sounds more like the prudential
172. Id.
173. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
174. Id. at 441.
175. Id.
176. Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1070 (5th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).
177. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555> 560-61 (1992) (defining the re-
quirements of Article III standing).
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zone -of-interests standing requirement, which "denies a right of review if the
plaintiffs interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes
implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress in-
tended to permit the suit.""' The zone -of- interests test goes to the relationship
between a party and the statutory (or constitutional) provision at issue. But for
that very reason, its logic merges with the view of Hunter as a rule of substantive
constitutional law holding that the Constitution grants no such rights to muni-
cipalities. And unlike the substantive constitutional law approach, the zone-of-
interests approach fails to explain three major features of the Hunter line of cas-
es: that Hunter applies (i) when municipalities are defendants, not just plain-
tiffs;' (2) in state court, not just federal court; and (3) when residents, not just
municipalities, bring suit.
First, standing does not limit the arguments that a party can make in de-
fense if it is sued. But in City of Trenton v. New Jersey, the Court applied Hunter
to block the claims of the municipal defendant, Trenton."so The state brought
an action against the city in state court, seeking to recover $14,310 under a 1907
state law requiring payments for diversions of river water for the public water
supply beyond a certain amount."' Trenton claimed that it had received the
right to divert unlimited water from the Delaware River from the Trenton Wa-
terworks company, which had been granted that right by the state in 1852.8
Trenton therefore alleged, in defense, that the 1907 law violated the Contracts,
Takings, and Due Process Clauses.183
The Supreme Court disagreed. Assuming that the Trenton Waterworks "re-
ceived a perpetual right," it did not "follow that the State as against the City is
bound by contract," because "[t]he relations existing between the State and the
water company were not the same as those between the State and the City."14
Whereas the water company was "privately owned and therefore safeguarded by
178. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987); see also Morris, supra note 3,
at 22-24 (discussing why prudential grounds of standing do not explain the Hunt-
er doctrine). While the zone- of-interests test is usually associated primarily with
cases brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, Clarke, 479 U.S. at 395,
Justice Scalia has argued that it should apply to constitutional claims as well.
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 468-73 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See gen-
erally Bradford C. Mank, Prudential Standing and the Dormant Commerce Clause:
Why the "Zone of Interests" Test Should Not Apply to Constitutional Cases, 48 ARIZ.
L. REV. 23, 35-44 (20o6) (discussing the application of the zone- of-interests test to
constitutional cases).
179. See Morris, supra note 3, at 22.
180. 262 U.S. 182 (1923).
181. Id. at 183.
182. Id. at 184.
183. Id. at 183.
184. Id. at 185.
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the constitutional provisions" at issue, the city was a mere "subdivision of the
State, created as a convenient agency for the exercise of such of the governmen-
tal powers of the state as may be entrusted to it.""' Thus, Trenton could not
avoid liability by challenging the constitutionality of the 1907 law.
If the Hunter rule is a doctrine of standing, then Trenton makes no sense,
because the city was the defendant. Nor is Trenton the only case where the
Hunter doctrine was used to block the claims of a defendant. Williams v. Eggles-
ton' and Attorney General ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey' are similar. Depicting Hunter
as a doctrine of standing does not explain the Court's decisions in these cases.
Second, the Supreme Court cannot review state court decisions about
standing,"' but the Supreme Court has affirmed state court decisions on Hunter
grounds."' It could only have done so if the decision below were a substantive
constitutional decision. If Hunter were a rule of federal court standing, it would
not have applied in the state court below, because federal standing doctrine
never applies in state courts.9 o The state courts could have adopted a Hunter-
like rule as part of state standing doctrine-but the Supreme Court would have
had no power to review such a rule, as state standing doctrine is "entirely a mat-
ter of state law."' Thus, the fact that these decisions were affirmed means that
Hunter must be a rule of substantive constitutional law.
The third problem with conceiving of Hunter as a doctrine of standing is
that standing depends on the specific plaintiffs bringing suit. In Hunter itself,
the plaintiffs included both residents of Allegheny and the city itself. If the doc-
trine was truly one that limited the standing of municipalities, the courts should
have dismissed the city from the suit while allowing the residents to maintain it.
But the court held against all of the plaintiffs.
Thus, the underlying purpose of Hunter matches how the Court has ap-
plied it. Hunter does not make sense as a doctrine of standing, either purposive-
ly or doctrinally.
Similar arguments disprove the minority view that Hunter is about munici-
pal capacity to sue and be sued.' The capacity to sue and be sued is "defined as
185. Id. at 185-87.
186. 170 U.S. 304 (1898).
187. 199 U.S. 233 (1905).
188. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 120 (2003).
189. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); City of Trenton v. New Jer-
sey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923).
190. Hicks, 539 U.S. at 120 ("[O]ur standing rules limit only thefederal courts' jurisdic-
tion over certain claims. '[S]tate courts are not bound by the limitations of a case
or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even when they address issues
of federal law."' (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989))).
191. Id.
192. See City of New York v. State, 655 N.E.2d 649 (N.Y. 1995); cf Morris, supra note 3
(arguing that Hunter sounds in capacity).
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a party's personal right to come into court." 93 For example, depending on state
law, children194 and dissolved corporations"9' may lack the capacity to sue or be
sued.
If Hunter were about the capacity to sue and be sued, it would not fulfill the
purpose of state policy flexibility. Private parties would be unaffected by the
doctrine. If private parties had standing, they could bring suit alleging that a
state law affecting municipal powers or boundaries violated the Contracts or
Due Process Clause. This would deny states policy flexibility.
Furthermore, if an entity does not have the capacity to sue and be sued, its
inability to sue is total. It does not vary depending on the legal claim it wishes to
bring. Capacity "should not be confused with the question of whether a party
has an enforceable right ... . Generally, capacity is conceived of as a procedural
issue dealing with the personal qualifications of a party to litigate and typically
is determined without regard to the particular claim or defense being as-
serted."'96 Thus, a child or dissolved corporation that lacks capacity can never
sue or be sued. It is not as if the child can sue in tort but not in contract. But
Hunter does not purport to claim that municipalities have no capacity to sue
whatsoever. Municipalities can sue in contract and tort. And there is a whole
body of law regarding when municipalities can be sued for violations of 42
U.S.C. § 1983.9 The Supreme Court had no problem adjudicating the case be-
tween New Jersey and the city of Trenton.' It held that the New Jersey law that
made Trenton liable was valid and unaffected by the Constitution, not that
Trenton could not be sued. Because Hunter only applies to constitutional
claims, it cannot be a doctrine of capacity to sue. Capacity, like standing, is a
doctrine that focuses on the identity of the party, not the nature of the right.
In sum, courts apply the Hunter doctrine regardless of the forum, the par-
ties, or the procedural posture of the case. It therefore cannot be a rule of feder-
al courts or civil procedure. It must be a rule of substantive law.
The substantive constitutional law view is also supported by the reasoning
of Gornillion v. Lightfoot, which treated Hunter as a substantive limitation on
"particular prohibitions of the Constitution,"' and by the subsequent line of
cases where the Court allowed constitutional challenges by municipalities
against their creating states. Unlike the original Hunter line of cases, these cases
did not concern municipal boundaries or powers. Rather, they sounded in ei-
193. 6A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 144, § 1559.
194. Id. § 1560 n.i.
195. Id. § 1563.
196. Id. § 1559.
197. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
198. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923); see also City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (allowing a suit between a city and a neighboring
state).
199. 364 U.S. 339, 344 (1960).
417
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
ther individual rights.oo or the supremacy of federal law.0 ' If the Hunter doc-
trine were a doctrine of standing or capacity to sue, such cases should never
have been heard on the merits. But these cases make perfect sense once Hunter
is understood as a doctrine of substantive constitutional law whose purpose is
to preserve state policy flexibility. Avoidance of the one-way ratchet problem
does not require that states bar cities from bringing suits alleging injuries to the
constitutional rights of their constituents or violations of federal law.
The mere fact that state law constructs municipalities does not mean that
state law has plenary power over municipalities to the exclusion of federal law.
Property rights are similar. They are constructed in the first instance by states
but are also products of federal law. Chief Justice Rehnquist promoted the "bit-
ter with the sweet" argument that the state, as author of a property interest un-
der Due Process Clause (the sweet), had plenary power over all aspects of the
right, including the ability to limit the procedural protections that came with it
(the bitter). 0 But the Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that due
process is a federal constitutional question, and state law serves merely to estab-
lish the existence of the right.0 3 Similarly, state law creates the municipality, but
that does not mean that state law has plenary power over the municipality's
substantive constitutional rights.204
Thus, Hunter limits the claims that litigants can invoke-but it applies to
all litigants challenging state action's effects on municipalities. Municipalities
have no special problems with standing. Justice Cardozo's famous language in
Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore-" [a] municipal corporation, created by a state
for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities under
the Federal Constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its
creator"-may not be wrong, but its focus on who is doing the invoking is mis-
leading. 0 In order to sensibly communicate the role of municipalities in our
constitutional order, we must refocus such language.
200. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
201. See, e.g., Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256
(1985); City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958).
202. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985); see also id. at 559
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 541 (majority opinion) (discussing the "bitter with the sweet" theory).
204. Michael Lawrence has made a similar claim to support his view that municipali-
ties should be able to bring procedural due process claims against their creating
states. Lawrence, supra note 43, at 107.
205. 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933).
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B. How Does the Constitution Protect Municipalities and Their Residents?
I have shown that Hunter is a doctrine of substantive constitutional law that
limits certain constitutional provisions in order to safeguard the state's flexibili-
ty in its municipal policy. This purpose does not argue for a blanket prohibition
on constitutional protection for municipalities.
As Gomillion shows, the Constitution can protect cities from states. When
should it?
I argue that there are three kinds of cases where state action regarding mu-
nicipalities should be subject to challenge: (i) when state action regarding mu-
nicipalities violates individual rights, as in Gomillion; (2) when state action re-
garding municipalities oversteps the state's authority in relation to federal
power, either in terms of the Supremacy Clause or the dormant Commerce
Clause; and (3) when recognizing a truly municipal constitutional right would
not overly limit state policy flexibility.
1. Individual Rights
Individual rights in the Constitution constrain state power over munici-
palities.206 As Gomillion v. Lightfoot,20 7 Washington v. Seattle School District No.
1,208 and Romer v. Evans20 , show, if a state violates the constitutional rights of
individuals, the fact that it does so by changing municipal powers or boundaries
does not insulate it from suit. As Justice Frankfurter explained in Gomillion,
The opposite conclusion, urged upon us by respondents, would sanc-
tion the achievement by a State of any impairment of voting rights
whatever so long as it was cloaked in the garb of the realignment of po-
litical subdivisions. "It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in
the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of
existence."1 0
Seattle School District No. 1 struck down a statewide voter initiative that
prohibited local school boards from voluntarily implementing busing programs
to alleviate de facto segregation. 1 It held that the state's power over its munici
palities is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids "plac[ing] spe-
cial burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legisla-
2o6. Barron, supra note 15, at 564-68.
207. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
208. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
209. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
210. 364 U.S. at 345 (quoting Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Cal., 271
U.S. 583, 594 (1926)).
211. 458 U.S. 457-
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tion.""' Similarly, Romer struck down a statewide constitutional amendment
that imposed a "special disability" on gays and lesbians by limiting, among oth-
er things, the laws that local governments could pass to protect them from dis-
crimination. 3 Again, rather than saying that the state could hide behind its
manipulation of local powers, the Court held that this very manipulation was
the problem. These cases stand for the proposition, contrary to Ysursa, that
there is such a thing as an individual right to the availability of a municipal
power, and that a decision to limit such a municipal power is not the same as a
decision not to exercise an analogous state power.
There is some conflict between these cases and Hunter's call for state policy
flexibility. The demands of individual rights sometimes carve a wedge out of the
state's ability to retract what it has given. But this is only appropriate. The Re-
construction Amendments seek to protect individual rights from the state; ab-
sent evidence that there was a clear intent to allow states to circumvent that
purpose by acting through their powers over municipalities, the Reconstruction
Amendments should be held to apply just as much to state power over munici-
palities as to state power over any other realm of policy.
Furthermore, this principle does not create a specifically one-way ratchet
problem. It places no special obligation on rights already given. A state could
run afoul as much by granting powers as by taking them away.
So individual rights enshrined in the Constitution limit a state's power over
its municipalities. As a result, municipalities can bring suit to vindicate these
rights. Because Hunter is a doctrine of substantive constitutional law, not stand-
ing, it no more limits municipalities from bringing suit to vindicate those rights
than it limits individuals from doing so. Thus, municipalities should be allowed
to participate in such suits where the effect on them makes them proper agents
of individual citizens. These cases ultimately sound in representational stand-
ing.f14 Municipalities may be better able to protect their residents' interests be-
cause they have the ability to aggregate the resources of their constituents.
212. Id. at 467 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
213. 517 U.S. at 631.
214. See Akron Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ. of Ohio, 490 F.2d 1285, 1289 (6th Cir.
1974) (allowing a municipal school board to sue state board of education, chal-
lenging a student transfer decision as racially discriminatory, under a representa-
tional standing theory); Dodd, supra note 54, at 983-84 (observing that "for several
centuries lawyers had found and practised [sic] a way of circumventing" the re-
quirement that "a corporation ow[ed] its existence solely to the grace of the
crown," for example by allowing unincorporated groups to bring "representative
suits, which enabled a member of an association to sue in equity in behalf of the
whole group"); Morris, supra note 3, at 7 (discussing "Constituent Cases"). A mu-
nicipality will usually be able to meet the three-prong test for associational stand-
ing. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) ("An
association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the inter-
ests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
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But because the Supreme Court has not been explicit about allowing these
suits, the courts of appeal have not always followed. For example, the Ninth
Circuit has held that Seattle School District No. 1 and its ilk are not binding
precedent because, according to the Ninth Circuit's framework, they are sub
silentio treatments of a jurisdictional matter (standing). " In the Ninth Circuit's
view, it will not be bound until the Supreme Court discusses the standing issue
explicitly. But the Supreme Court may have no occasion to do so, because, as
discussed earlier, it correctly behaves as if Hunter is a rule of substantive consti-
tutional law. The Supreme Court should squarely hold that Hunter is a substan-
tive doctrine, thereby demolishing the Ninth Circuit's entire framework. But
Gomillion should be close enough to a square holding for the Ninth Circuit to
reverse course and allow suits like Seattle School District No. 1 and Romer.
The lower courts are confused in part because, since the constitutional
rights revolution, the Court has rarely confronted Hunter squarely. The Consti-
tution limits state action much more than it did when the last proper Hunter
cases were handed down in the 1930s. Nearly all of the Bill of Rights has been
incorporated against the states, and both procedural due process and equal pro-
tection have more force in noneconomic matters than they once did. The con-
fusion is not helped by the fact that Gomillion, one of the few cases to address
Hunter head-on, was decided based on the Fifteenth Amendment, rather than
the Fourteenth. A subsequent case held that Gomillion should have been de-
cided on Fourteenth Amendment grounds 6 but that has affected the world of
voting rights more than the world of municipal rights.1
2. Federal Supremacy
The Supremacy Clause also constrains state power over municipalities.11 If
state law violates the specific dictates of federal law, the fact that it does so
members in the lawsuit."). The presence of contradictory interests within an asso-
ciation does not create problems under prong (c). See Nat'l Mar. Union of Am. v.
Commander, Military Sealift Command, 824 F.2d 1228, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("If
the Supreme Court's UAW opinion decided that associational standing is not de-
feated by conflicting member interests, as we rather think it did, we are, of course,
bound by that. But the matter is not entirely clear and we should state why we
would reach that conclusion in any event.").
215. Burbank- Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1363
( 9th Cir. 1998).
216. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 63o, 645 (1993).
217. No reported case cites Shaw to modify Hunter.
218. Roderick Hills has written a fascinating examination of "the extent to which fed-
eral law can delegate federal powers to specific state or local institutions even
against the will of the state legislature." Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State:
The Use of Federal Law To Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures'
Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1999).
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through its power over municipalities does not make it valid. Thus, if federal
law grants powers"' or funds" 0 to cities, state law cannot countermand that
grant of power or funds. In other words, the Supremacy Clause empowers Con-
gress to grant municipalities rights and powers against the states that created
those municipalities (assuming, of course, that Congress is acting within its
enumerated powers).
The saga of the City of Tacoma's efforts to build two dams illustrates this
point. Tacoma applied to the Federal Power Commission (FPC) to build a
pair of dams. One of the dams would have flooded a salmon hatchery owned by
the State of Washington, so the state intervened in the FPC proceedings, ar-
guing that Washington law required the city to obtain permission from the
state, in part because of the nature of the dam and in part because cities lack
power to condemn state-owned land under Washington law.2213 The FPC
granted the city the license to build the dams.224 The Ninth Circuit upheld the
decision 2 5 and the Supreme Court affirmed.226 As Roderick Hills explains, the
real dispute in the case "rested on whether the Federal Power Commission
could bestow the power to condemn state-owned land on the City of Tacoma
even though state statutes were silent on the question of whether the City pos-
sessed this power." 2 The city's victory affirmed that Congress had validly au-
thorized the FPC to bestow that power. Thus, federal law can give cities judi-
cially enforceable powers against, and contrary to the will of, their creating
states.
Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School District No. 40-1 is another in-
teresting illustration of this point. It concerned the Payment in Lieu of Taxes
Act, which compensates local governments that have federal lands in their ju-
risdiction for the inability to tax those lands even though the localities need to
provide services related to them.22' The Act states that each unit of local gov-
ernment receiving funds "may use the payment for any governmental pur-
pose."11 9 The litigation arose after South Dakota passed a law requiring counties
219. See City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958).
220. See Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256 (1985).
221. See id.; Hills, supra note 218, at 1232-40.
222. See Wash. Dep't of Game v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 207 F.2d 391, 393 (9th Cir. 1953).
For a clear and more detailed exposition of this convoluted litigation, see Hills,
supra note 218, at 1272-74.
223. Wash. Dep't of Game, 207 F.2d at 395.
224. Id. at 398.
225. Id.
226. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958).
227. Hills, supra note 218, at 1273-74.
228. Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 258 (1985).
229. Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (2012)).
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to distribute the funds in the same proportions that they distributed general tax
revenues-for example, if a county normally distributed sixty percent of its
general tax revenues to its school districts, it would have to distribute sixty per-
cent of its Payment in Lieu of Taxes funds to school districts. 30 The Supreme
Court held that the state statute was invalid under the Supremacy Clause be-
cause it "obstruct[ed] th[e] congressional purpose" to give localities free reign
in using the funds. 31 In effect, this meant that the federal statute preempted any
state attempt to regulate the use of funds. The county had a right to use the
funds as it saw fit, and it could enforce this right against a state statute in federal
court.
These cases show that federal statutes should be able to limit state power
over municipalities. This principle is generally consistent with Hunter's purpose
of state policy flexibility. It does not set into stone the powers or boundaries
that states grant their municipalities; it just layers on top of those grants an ad-
ditional set of federal funds or powers. This does not create a one-way ratchet
problem. Moreover, any flexibility that is lost is transferred to another sove-
reign, which can reverse its decisions with a mere legislative majority.
Roderick Hills has criticized Lawrence County as insufficiently precise. In
his view, the opinion erroneously suggests that the counties can use
Payment-in-Lieu-of-Taxes funds to engage in activities that state law does not
authorize them to conduct. In order to avoid this conclusion and preserve the
state's traditional regulatory authority, Hills distinguishes between general state
regulatory laws, which can limit what activities counties can pursue, and state
laws that specifically redirect Payment-in-Lieu-of-Taxes funds, which per Law-
rence County are invalid."3
I agree with Hills, but would apply his argument more broadly. States
should be able to pass general regulatory laws, even when federal funds flow to
localities, but they should not be able to directly countermand the specific dic-
tates of federal law. In the Payment-in-Lieu-of-Taxes context, that would bar
laws redirecting revenue; if federal law gave a municipality federal eminent do-
main power, 33 it would bar state efforts to take away that specific power. But
neither federal law would prevent the state from abolishing the municipality,
changing its education or environmental policy, or passing other laws that indi-
rectly affect the federal power or grant of funds.
States create localities, and the federal government must take them as it
finds them. But once it finds them and seeks to act with them-by funding
them, granting them powers, or taking powers away-states cannot pass any
laws specifically countermanding the directive of federal law. A state could re-
draw all its school districts, but it could not direct them to use federal funds for
educating disabled children in a manner that contradicts federal law. The anal-
230. Id. at 259.
231. Id. at 270.
232. Hills, supra note 218, at 1235.
233. See City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 323 (1958).
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ogy to property rights is instructive. While the state can legislatively abolish a
property right, it cannot specifically countermand the dictates of due process,
nor seek to craft its own due process regime that overrides the federal regime.
While this Section is focused on the Supremacy Clause, that is not the only
constitutional doctrine limiting state power for structural reasons. The dormant
Commerce Clause should be treated similarly to the Supremacy Clause. That is,
a state should be no more able to violate the dormant Commerce Clause
through its actions regarding municipalities than through any other actions.
This is the view of the California Supreme Court.234
3. Municipal Rights
So far, I have established that state power over municipalities is constrained
by constitutional law regarding the rights of individuals and by the supremacy
of federal statutes that grant funds or powers to municipalities. I now turn to
whether state power over municipalities is constrained by constitutional rights
held by the municipalities themselves.
Current law recognizes that municipalities themselves can have constitu-
tional rights. For example, United States v. So Acres of Land noted that the Tak-
ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires compensation when the United
States exercises the power of eminent domain over public entities, including
municipalities. 35 Compensation is due not only because of the rights of munic-
ipal constituents, but also because the municipality itself is a bearer of rights:
When the United States condemns a local public facility, the loss to the
public entity, to the persons served by it, and to the local taxpayers may
be no less acute than the loss in a taking of private property. Therefore,
it is most reasonable to construe the reference to "private property" in
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment as encompassing the prop-
erty of state and local governments when it is condemned by the Unit-
ed States. Under this construction, the same principles of just compen-
sation presumptively apply to both private and public condemnees. 6
Not only does 5o Acres show that municipalities themselves can bear
rights-it also suggests that there is no presumption against municipalities
bearing rights. So Acres finds that municipalities are protected by the Takings
Clause in spite of the fact that the Clause speaks explicitly of "private proper-
ty." 3 7 So Acres uses purpose to override the plain meaning of the text-and it is
therefore the opposite of a rule requiring a clear statement to show that muni-
cipalities have rights. In fact, municipal rights against the United States may ex-
tend beyond the Takings Clause. For example, the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
234. Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 719 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1986).
235. 469 U.S. 24,31 (1984).
236. Id.
237. Id. (emphasis added).
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peals has held that political subdivisions have due process property rights
against the federal government, even though states do not have such rights.38
Given that municipalities can have constitutional rights, that constitutional
rights can limit state power over municipalities, and that federal statutory law
can give municipalities rights against their states, municipalities can have con-
stitutional rights against their creating states.
So, what constitutional rights do municipalities have? Hunter stands for a
presumption against municipal rights that would burden the state's authority to
grant powers to its municipalities by setting such grants in stone. But where
municipal rights would not substantially limit state policymaking flexibility,
general principles of constitutional interpretation come into the foreground
and may demand the recognition of municipal rights. Thus, where Hunter's
demands are weak, constitutional values that municipalities can further should
be allowed to win the day, even when, as in 5o Acres, the literal application of
constitutional text does not argue for the extension of rights to municipalities.
Free speech is an excellent candidate for a municipal right. 9 Hunter's de-
mands are weak, municipalities have a meaningful role to play in furthering the
constitutional value of free speech, and the text does nothing to argue against
the extension of the right.
First, municipal free speech will generally not raise serious problems with
state policy flexibility. For example, municipal speech might involve activities
such as passing expressive city council resolutions, 40 posting expressive signs, 41
or hosting talks at libraries. Shielding these activities from state censorship will
not mean that states cannot shape municipal institutions, but merely that they
cannot take targeted actions against speech-related functions of those institu-
tions. Speech activities will usually bear little connection to the flexibility pur-
pose of Hunter; where there is a clash of constitutional values, the matter can be
adjudicated in that specific context.
Second, municipal free speech furthers the purposes of the First Amend-
ment.' 4' Local institutions are a vital part of public debate. One way that activ-
238. In re Real Estate Title & Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig., 869 F.2d 760, 765 1.3 (3d
Cir. 1989).
239. See generally Fagundes, supra note 52 (proposing a framework for analyzing the
free- speech-in- government context).
240. See Creek v. Vill. of Westhaven, 8o F.3d 186, 193 (7 th Cir. 1996) ("Thus if federal
law imposed a fine on municipalities that passed resolutions condemning abor-
tion, one might suppose that a genuine First Amendment issue would be pre-
sented.").
241. See Fagundes, supra note 52, at 1637 ("Imagine that the Vermont Agency of Trans-
portation uses state funds to erect a series of highway billboards critical of the Iraq
War, and that the United States Congress-in an attempt to end the practice in
Vermont and deter it elsewhere-responds by passing a law that levies substantial
fines on any state that engages in such expression.")
242. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Com-
munications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1229
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ists organize on national issues is through the expressive organs of local gov-
ernment. It would be a sad day in America if Texas could stop the residents of
Austin from expressing their views on matters of state and national policy
through their city council. Nor is it clear why state legislatures should be able to
regulate the content of book talks held in local libraries any more than they
could regulate such talks if they were held in local bookstores. Furthermore,
Citizens United "rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or
other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment
simply because such associations are not 'natural persons." 43 Speech in asso-
ciation is protected like individual speech.244 Municipalities are sites of associa-
tion, often more so than corporations.
Third, the constitutional text does nothing to argue against municipal free
speech. As David Fagundes has pointed out, the Speech Clause is unusual in
that it "does not identify any limitations on the identities of the speakers on
whom that safeguard is bestowed."245 This makes it different from many "other
substantive constitutional protections, which do specify the entities on which
they confer rights."246
This argument for municipal free speech challenges Ysursa's holding that
state laws limiting municipal expression are the equivalent of the state declining
to speak.247 This presumes that municipalities have no existence separate from
the state. But Seattle School District No. 1 and Romer treated laws taking away
municipal powers as distinct from laws declining to exercise analogous powers
at the state level. Thus, the Constitution does see municipalities as having an ex-
istence separate from the state. But Ysursa does not cite either case, much less
grapple with them. Furthermore, as Justice Stevens noted in dissent, decisions
of the Court regarding liability and immunity have attached "constitutional
significance [to] the relationship a State chooses to establish with its political
subdivisions."248
(1991); Fagundes, supra note 52, at 1637; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather
K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1310 (2009) (discussing
the merits of vigorous debate between government entities).
243. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010) (describing a
holding of a prior case). One interesting question is whether Citizens United ar-
gues for allowing municipalities to make campaign contributions in federal elec-
tions.
244. Id. at 904 ("If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fin-
ing or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political
speech.").
245. Fagundes, supra note 52, at 1648.
246. Id.
247. 555 U.S. 353, 362-64 (2009).
248. Id. at 374 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Kathleen Morris echoes this point, arguing that
state constitutions often limit the power that state legislatures have over local gov-
ernments. Morris, supra note 3, at 6.
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Justice Stevens indicated that he was open to considering municipalities as
separate entities, such that speech restrictions placed on them are more akin to
speech restrictions placed on private bodies than to speech restrictions placed
by the state on itself.249 Since the First Amendment speaks in the language of
limited government power, not individual rights-"Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech"5 0 -recognizing a municipality as a
separate entity would mean that municipalities have free speech rights against
the state.
Of course, as Fagundes acknowledges, recognizing a free speech right for
governments raises complicated questions of intergovernmental relations. Note
that this problem is not unique to the state-local relationship; it would be raised
within the federal-state and federal-local relationships as well. Environmental
Defense Center, Inc. v. EPA both illustrates this problem and shows the begin-
nings of a way out. 5' The EPA issued regulations requiring municipal storm-
water drainage systems to educate their citizens about the hazards of improper
waste disposal. A number of municipalities sued, alleging compelled speech.
The Ninth Circuit came to a sensible accommodation, holding that the required
information was not ideological speech and was therefore unobjectionable un-
der compelled speech doctrine." The court therefore avoided interjecting free
speech into a factual regulatory matter. 53
C. How Does the Constitution Protect Municipalities from Other State
Actors?
i. Challenges to Municipal Action
A further question is whether Hunter should apply in suits where a political
subdivision challenges the actions of another political subdivision, rather than
the state. 54 Neighboring cities can deprive each other of property, implicating
due process. But, unlike the state legislature, one city does not have plenary
power over another. One city cannot revoke or modify another municipality's
powers at will. Thus, while we may say that, against the state legislature, a city
249. Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 373-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens did not ultimate-
ly decide this issue. "Because my conclusion that § 44-2004(2) discriminates
against labor organizations is sufficient to decide this case, I find it unnecessary to
fully consider the implications of Idaho's relationship with its political subdivi-
sions. Rather, I note the significance of this relationship to urge its careful consid-
eration in future cases." Id. at 375.
250. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
251. 344 F-3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003).
252. Id. at 849-50.
253. Id. at 849 n.23.
254. See generally Hollway, supra note 45 (arguing that municipalities should have a
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to sue other municipalities).
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has no property for which it can claim due process, against another city, it
seems that it does have property interests-especially since it has property in-
terests against the federal government under 5o Acres."'
Obviously, municipalities should be able to challenge municipal action on
any grounds they can challenge state action, such as where the action violates
individual constitutional rights or federal law asserting national interests. The
question is whether political subdivisions should be able to challenge the ac-
tions of other political subdivisions in the same state as violations of their prop-
erty rights under the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses.
All the circuits that have considered the question have said no. Wright and
Miller agree."' Accordingly, courts have cited this rule to block a town from
challenging another town's ordinance under the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses;" a municipally owned waste disposal corporation from challeng-
ing a town's ordinance under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses;"'
and a state-created Indian Housing Authority from challenging a city's action
under the Equal Protection Clause. 59
But according to the policy-flexibility view of Hunter, these limitations on
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses are unnecessary. The need to
avoid the one-way ratchet problem does not require that municipalities lack the
Fourteenth Amendment rights against other municipalities that private persons
have. When one city zones land next to another city,"' a due process challenge
by the neighboring municipality does not take away the state's ability to change
the arrangement of municipal powers and boundaries-certainly no more than
the equivalent due process challenge by a neighboring private landowner. There
is no reason to hold that municipalities must act according to due process when
their actions affect private property owners but not when their actions affect
public property owners.
Granting municipalities constitutional rights against each other may serve
the cause of good governance. Municipalities can impose costs on other muni-
cipalities that the acting municipality does not take into account. In many cases
the issue will not be sufficiently important to merit the attention of other con-
255. United States v. 5o Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984).
256. 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 144, § 3531-11-1.
257. City of New Rochelle v. Town of Mamaroneck, III F. Supp. 2d 353, 357-58
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (barring due process and equal protection challenges but allow-
ing a dormant Commerce Clause challenge).
258. S. Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Twp. of Washington, 790 F.2d 500, 503-04 (6th Cir.
1986).
259. Hous. Auth. of Kaw Tribe v. City of Ponca City, 952 F.2d 1183 (ioth Cir. 1991).
260. See River Vale Twp. v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1968) (al-
lowing a due process challenge by a municipality to a zoning ordinance of a dif-
ferent municipality in a neighboring state).
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flict- resolution bodies, such as the state legislature.6 1 Moreover, the require
ment that government act according to the demands of due process is a consti-
tutional value that transcends instrumental reasons. Finally, courts already ad-
judicate common law disputes between governmental entities, 6 so the bare
fact of court adjudication is not problematic. While one could argue that the
problem is federal court involvement, this would be an entirely different rule,
and would be in tension with the holding in Virginia Office for Protection & Ad-
vocacy v. Stewart that there was no sovereign immunity problem with a state
agency suing state officials in federal court.263
2. Challenges to Agency Action
A more complicated question is whether Hunter means that municipalities
have no constitutional rights against state agencies. I suggest that the answer
depends on whether the agency active is adjudicatory or legislative in nature.
Where the legislature has delegated its legislative authority to an executive
agency, Hunter should retain its force, such that a state regulation is immune
from claims that it violates the Contracts, Just Compensation, or Due Process
Clauses by infringing on municipal powers or property. When the legislature
delegates its legislative authority, it should be able to delegate that full authority.
The legislature may well decide that the interests of the state are best served by
delegating legislative authority to an expert agency. If it does so, it should be
able to delegate its flexibility to give and freely take away under Hunter. Other-
wise, the state would be forced to choose between delegation and flexibility.
For example, Part I discussed how Hunter protected the Connecticut legis-
lature's ability to change its policy for transportation over the Connecticut Riv-
er, moving from a municipally run ferry to a private toll bridge and then to a
publicly operated bridge free of tolls. But we can also imagine a world in which,
instead of determining the specific modes of transportation itself, the legislature
might have found it preferable to delegate the decision to an agency staffed with
experts. If it did so, it should have been able to grant the same ability to change
course to that agency.
261. See, e.g., River Vale Twp., 403 F.2d at 685 (involving the rezoning of a wooded area
into an office park district); City of New Rochelle, III F. Supp. 2d at 357 (involving
a dispute over whether to build an Ikea store).
262. See I EUGENE MCQUILLIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS § 3A:21 (3rd ed. 2012) ("Intergovernmental cooperation has become a ne-
cessity, and therefore it is not uncommon for municipalities and states to contract
with each other. The inevitable result has been that contractual disputes have ari-
sen between cities and states."); 4 RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLAN-
NING § 63:27 (4 th ed. 2012) ("Where a municipality is the owner of land within a
neighboring municipality, it is in the same position as any other property owner.
It is entitled to protect its property right and its standing is determined by the
same factors relating to 'aggrievement' that apply to any other property owner.").
263. 131 S. Ct. 1632 (2011).
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City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co. further illustrates the point.6 4
The Oklahoma legislature had created the Oklahoma Corporation Commission
and delegated to it "general supervision over all public utilities, with power to
fix and establish rates and to prescribe rules, requirements and regulations, af-
fecting their services.""' The Commission issued an order regulating natural
gas rates and services, which had the effect of overriding a contract that the city
had with a gas company. The city challenged the order as a violation of the
Contracts Clause. The Court treated this as a classic Hunter case, with the city
having no more ability to challenge a legislative action by the Commission than
the equivalent action by the legislature. The legislature could have adopted the
order itself; it should not matter that it delegated that authority to the Commis-
sion. A contrary ruling would have burdened delegations of authority to agen-
cies by making them necessarily incomplete. Thus, Hunter should apply the
same to legislative actions by state administrative bodies as it does to legislative
actions by state legislatures. 66
CONCLUSION
The Hunter doctrine limiting municipal constitutional rights originates in a
concern with controlling potentially powerful corporate actors. Today, of
course, we are not worried that San Francisco will raise an army and overrun
Sacramento. The doctrine also comes from a time of skepticism about anti-
egalitarian and monopolistic corporations, both public and private. But cities
have changed. Today, the animating purpose behind Hunter is flexibility in state
policymaking-the notion that a sovereign state should not have to worry
about making grants of powers, boundaries, or privileges to a subordinate mu-
nicipal corporation, because the sovereign state can change its mind should cir-
cumstances warrant.
Recognition of this purpose limits Hunter's reach. First, when added to case
law analysis, it shows that Hunter is a substantive rule about what the Constitu-
tion means, not a doctrine of standing or capacity to sue that depends on the
party asserting the claim. Second, it shows that federal law can limit state power
over municipalities, so long as there is no substantial one-way ratchet problem.
Thus, individual rights and federal supremacy limit state power over municipal-
ities. Third, it opens the door to claims that municipalities themselves can have
rights as long as they do not interfere substantially with state policy-making
flexibility. Free speech is a promising candidate. Fourth, it shows why munici-
palities should be able to sue other municipalities for constitutional violations.
Finally, it shows why municipalities should not be able to sue administrative
264. 250 U.S. 394 (1919).
265. Id. at 395-96 (internal citation omitted).
266. However, when an agency adjudicates rather than legislates, the question becomes
more difficult. The question is beyond the scope of this Note.
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agencies for legislative actions taken in a legislative capacity, but perhaps should
be able to sue agencies for adjudicatory actions.
This analysis corrects the maximalist views of Hunter embraced recently by
the Supreme Court in Ysursa and long embraced by the Ninth Circuit. It also
corrects other problems: the failure of courts to consider Hunter's purpose, of-
ten leading to an overly broad reading of the doctrine; the more narrow errors
made by the Tenth Circuit construing Hunter as a doctrine of standing (albeit
one that does not bar all constitutional claims); the error of the New York
Court of Appeals construing Hunter as a doctrine of capacity to sue; and the er-
rors of many courts blocking suits between municipalities on Hunter grounds.
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